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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENER-
AL DETERMINATION OF ALL 
THE RIGHTS TO USE OF WATER, 
BOTH SURF ACE AND UNDER-
GROUND, WITHIN THE DRAIN-
AGE AREA OF THE BEAR RIVER 
IN RICH COUNTY, UTAH. 
RICH COUNTY-OTTER CREEK IR-
RIGATION COMPANY, and WIL-
LIAM T. REX, RAYMOND L. Case No. 9285 
HOFFMAN, HENRY T. NICHOLLS, 
EMl\TA IRETA ARGYLE, FRANK 
H. JACKSON and ADEN W. THOR-
NOCK, 
Respondents and Cross Appellants, 
vs. 
GRANT LAMBORN, H,OWARD L. 
LAMBORN and KEITH JESSOP, 
Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
The Appellants are attempting to extend their 
use to irrigate 355 acres to July 1st and Re-
spondents have cross appealed, contending the 
trial court erred in finding the appellants had 
acquired any rights to adverse use and that appel-
lants use is limited to the irrigation of 180 acres 
as decreed by Judge Call. 
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It is the Respondent's position Appellants have 
not acquired any rights in excess of those granted 
to the Appellants' predecessor in interest by the 
Judge Call decree of 1919, and the trial court erred 
in finding that Appellants' predecessor in interest 
had between 1919 and 1939 acquired by adverse 
use the right, to June 1st of each year, to use suf-
ficient water to irrigate 355 acres of land, or 175 
acres in addition to that granted by the decree. 
Respondents rely on two propositions for re-
versal: ( 1) The trial court having found interrup-
tions in the use of the water as of June 1st they are 
entitled to a finding, as a matter of law, that no 
adverse rights were acquired and (2) a person can-
not acquire adverse rights while subject to an in-
junction. 
The use of the word "Respondents" herein shall 
include a reference to Respondents and/or their 
predecessors in interest, and Respondents as cross-
appellants. 
FACTS 
We shall hereafter set forth facts in addition 
to those indicated by the Appellants and shall note 
wherein we disagree. 
The respondents and appellants agree they 
are bound by the provisions of Judge Call's 
Decree of 1919, except appellants claim they have 
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adversed the defendants for additional water up 
to the first of J tlly. ( R. 8-9) 
Otter Creek is a natural water course consist-
ing of the north, middle and south forks which 
flows from a westerly to an easterly direction, with-
in Rich County, through the lands of the appellants 
and respondents; the lands of the appellants are 
located above the lands of the respondents and the 
water first reaches the lands of the appellants 
(Findings of Fact, Case No. 43) . 
The Call Decree awarded to the respondents 
sufficient water to irrigate 1960 acres with seepage 
and overflow rights: 
'' ... are the owners of and entitled at 
all times during the irrigation season of each 
and every year, to-wit, from April 1st to 
November 1st, to divert and use the flow of 
the waters from the south, middle and north 
forks of Otter Creek in Rich County, Utah, 
a sufficient quantity of water to irrigate 1960 
acres for the irrigation of their lands, the 
watering of stock, and for domestic use, and 
in addition are the owners of, and entitled 
to their respective share and proportion of 
all seepage and underflow of water which 
drains into said Otter Creek, and from the 
various branches thereof, by such irrigation, 
on a basis which 1960 acres bears to the total 
of 2140 acres." (P 1 of Call's Decree, Case 
No. 43) 
And Richard Jackson and his successors in interest 
were enjoined, during April 1st and November 1st 
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of each and every year, from diverting or using 
more water than was necessary to irrigate 180 
acres of land plus his respective share of seepage, 
overflow and domestic rights. (P 2, Call Decree, 
Case No. 43). 
The Call Decree was silent as to priority. How-
ever, Judge Jones decreed the rights of the appel-
lants and respondents were equal and he modifed 
the Call Decree to provide for water duty of three 
acre feet of water per acre per year (Case No. 299, 
page 21-24). 
Mr. Neville, the Engineer, did not accept the 
appointment to administer the stream and Judge 
Call on October 1, 1920 revoked his appointment 
and appointed Jesse J. Read in his place (Case 
No. 43). This appointment was agreeable to and 
concurred in by Richard Jackson, the appellants' 
predecessor in interest (R 118-119). It does not 
appear that Mr. Read acted, however, until 1927 
(R 159). 
The provisions of the State Engineer's proposed 
Decree was arrived at in ignorance of Judge Call's 
Decree, although it had been filed with his office, 
it had been stored in the b·asement of the State 
Capitol Bt1ilding. The mem·bers of his office were 
unacquainted with its provisions (R 202, 216). The 
proposed Decree would have awarded 10 c.f.s. of 
water, with a priority of 18'70, to appellants to 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
irrigate 355 acres, April 1st to October 1st of each 
year and the balance of the stream 3.5 c.f.s. was 
to be awarded to the respondents to irrigate their 
2190 acres of land, notwithstanding that after July 
1st all of respondents land must be irrigated from 
Otter Creek. The creek has a constant flow of 13.5 
c.f.s. The State Engineer fixed a duty of 1 c.f.s. to 
60 acres (R 207, 210-212, 135-136, 177). 
Any attempt by appellant's predecessors in in-
terest to use water in addition to that awarded by 
the Call Decree was several times each year, with 
the knowledge of the appellants' predecessors in 
interest (the Jacksons) interrupted by the respon-
dents, and they not only went upstream and took 
their water but they employed engineers, water 
masters and built diversion dams to insure their 
receiving that portion of the water awarded them 
by Judge Call (R 105-109, 153-155, 130, 150, 142-
143, 193, 121-123-124-125, 157-158-159, 12'9-130, 
111-112, 134-136, 163-164, 160-161, 182, 172-173, 
169). 
Sometime prior to 1919 wooden weirs were 
placed in the Creek at the Jackson property to divide 
the water between the Jacksons and the lower users, 
the respondents. The weirs became obsolete ·and 
the division was made by the use of earth dams 
until1927 when they were rebuilt by Jesse J. Read. 
(R 108-110, 159). As rebuilt they were in use until 
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1930 when they were replaced (R 130-135). 
We admit appellants' predecessors in interest 
claim they had irrigated their lands between 1919 
and 1939 as they had prior to the entry of the Call 
Decree. In so doing, however, they did not limit 
their claim to July 1st, in the Court below, but in-
sisted the adverse period extended over the irriga-
tion period from April 1st to November 1st of each 
year. They urged the trial Court to approve the 
proposed decree of the State Engineer which would 
have granted them the right to irrigate 355 acres 
from April 1st to October 1st of each year. (Find-
ings of Fact, Counterclaim of Richard Jackson in 
Case No. 43, State Engineer's proposed Decree pages 
159-161, R 2). Appellants in their statement of 
points on appeal No.2 allege: 
"The Court erred in failing to hold that 
the respondents and appellants and their pre-
decessors in interest have at all times since 
the Call Decree entered in December, 1919 
openly, notoriously, continuously and adverse-
ly used the water of Otter Creek through the 
irrig~ation season to mature crops on their 
355 acres of land." (page 35, Case No. 299) 
Emphasis added. 
The use of the word "respondents" in the desig-
nation was undoubtedly inadvertently included. 
The appellants and respondents use of Otter 
Creek was continuous and not intermittent (R 38-
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41-48, 62, 15-18, 111, 112, 113-114, 180, 129-132-
135-137, 159-161, 134-137). 
Although, the ,Jacksons continued to use the 
same irrigation system or ditches as prior to 1919, 
they were attempting to spread the water decreed 
over the 355 acre tract, except such times as they 
were wrongfully using the respondents water. They 
did not cut the acreage but the water used (R 117, 
129-130, 132, 17 4-175, 197). 
We agree that some of the respondents testi-
fied they had adequate water except for dry years 
until the Woodruff C·anal water was turned off on 
July 1st, for their land below the canal. This does not 
apply to all of the respondents and particularly this 
is not true as to the lands lying above the Canal. 
CROSS APPEAL 
POINT RELIED ON 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
APPELLANTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN IN-
TEREST HAVE AT ALL TIMES SINCE THE CALL 
DECREE ENTERED IN DECEMBER OF 1919, OPEN-
LY, NOTORIOUSLY, CONTINUOUSLY AND ADVERSE-
LY USED THE WATERS OF OTTER CREEK ON THEIR 
355 ACRES OF LAND FROM APRIL 1ST TO J'UNE 
1ST OF EACH IRRIGATION SEASON. (P. 39, CASE 
299) 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT HAVING FOUND IN-
TERRUPTIONS AS OF JUNE 1ST RESPON-
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DENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A FINDING AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, THAT NO ADVERSE 
RIGHTS ~/ERE ACQUIRED IRRESPECTIVE 
OF V/HETHER THE USE WAS FOR THE IRRI-
GATION SEASON OR TO JULY 1ST. 
The respondents and appellants agree they are 
bound by Judge Call's Decree except that since its 
entry appellants claim they have acquired a right 
by adverse use to irrigate 35'5 acres of land to July 
1st. They did not claim this limitation before the 
trial court but on the contrary insisted that the 
usage extended throughout the irrigation season, 
as they urged: ( 1) the Court to approve the State 
Engineer's proposed decree that would have con-
firmed their right to irrigate 355 acres for the irri-
gation season (R 2, Proposed decree 158-159). (2) 
They attempted to establish that they had used the 
water durin·g the period 1919 to 1939 in the same 
manner as they had used it prior to the entry of the 
decree in 1919 and in those proceedings they claimed 
the use from April 1st to November 1st. (See coun-
terclaim Richard Jackson Case No. 43) and ( 3) 
In their points relied on for this appeal, they assign-
ed as error the trial court's failure to decree their 
rights to irrigate 355 acres for the irrigation season 
(p. 35 Case No. 299). 
Appellants are now retreating from their posi-
tion before the trial court, realizing that interrup-
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tions whether they are of June 1st or July 1st is 
effective to interrupt the adverse period, where they 
claim a use for the irrigation season. 
As pointed out the trial court found inter-
ruptions in the uses as of June 1st and in this 
respect appellants agree there is evidence to support 
the finding. 
This Court in Wellsville East Field 11~rigation 
Co. vs. Linds,ay Land and Livestock Co., 104 Utah, 
48, 137, Pac. 2d, 643, the decision relied on by the 
appellants, laid down the rule that an interruption 
during the period of use interrupts the running 
of the adverse period, and the trial court having 
found interruptions as of June 1st the respondents 
are entitled as a matter of law to a finding and 
decree that the appellants did not acquire any rights 
by adverse use. 
Appellants maintain that the facts in Wells-
ville E,ast Field Irrig~ation Co. vs. Lindsay Land and 
Livestock Coo, supra, are similar to this case. This 
is not so, for in that case there was no interruption 
during the period of adverse use. Nichols the ad-
verser, used the water approximately two days of 
each ten days on one tract from June to September, 
inclusive and on the other tract he watered it four 
times a season. Mter irrigating the land he would 
shut the water off. There was no evidence that an 
interruption occurred during this limited period of 
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use. On one occasion when he was seen using the 
water, he was requested to cooperate and use it 
sparingly to which he agreed stating he would use 
it proportionately as did the others and that he 
would turn it off when he finished irrigating. The 
Irrigation Company did not interfere with his use. 
Nichols situation was clearly one of rotation with 
the other users on a fixed rotation schedule, while 
here the use of the water by appellants predecessors 
in interest was conti11uous. They continuously used 
approximately 1/12 of the stream during the irriga-
tion season and 11/12 of the stream was continuous-
ly used by the respondents as their proportionate 
share as determined by the Call Decree and when 
appellants predecessors in interest were using the 
water in excess of that awarded them this use was 
also continuous. They merely increased the amount 
of water over that awarded by the Court. Each year 
the respondents on several occasions with the knowl-
edeg and help of the appellants predecessors in in-
terest during the claimed adverse period recaptured 
their water. 
CONTINUOUS USE 
The appellants relied on the testimony of Lem 
Jackson in claiming intermittent use (R 38-41). 
However, he did not testify to this but rather that 
the use was continuous; that they irrigated daily 
from Otter Creek and that one or more dams were 
10 
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always in place and that the water was always run-
ning in one of their irrigation ditches; that although 
he was not on the ditches all the time he was irrigat-
ing continuously (R 38-41, 48) and their witness 
Melvin Jackson testified that the dams diverting 
the water on to appellants property were never out 
until after haying time (R 61-62). 
In attempting to establish adverse use the 
sons of Richard Jackson testified they used the 
water from 1919 to 1939 in the same manner 
as they had used it prior to the entry of the Call 
decree. In the pleadings in that case Civil No. 43 
the appellant Richard Jackson alleged that he had 
contin~tously used sufficient water from Otter Creek 
to irrigate 380.22 acres of land during the period 
April 1st to November 1st of each year. (See para-
graph 2 of counterclaim Case No. 43). That appel-
lants claimed the use was continuous before the trial 
court is apparent from paragraph 2 of their "state-
ment of points relied on appeal" for therein they 
stated the Court erred in failing to hold that appel-
lants had continuously and adversely used the water 
of Otter Creek through the irrigation season (Page 
35, Case No. 299). 
That the use was continuous and not inter-
mittent is, also, supported by the fact that weirs were 
used for dividing the water at the Jackson ranch 
and that the Jacksons and respondents divided 1/12 
11 
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to the Jacksons and 11/12 to the respondents or their 
proportionate share of the water (R 106-13, 134, 
159-160, 165-169). 
INTERRUPTIONS 
As a result of Richard Jackson, one of appel-
lants' predecessors in interest, attempt to enlarge 
his rights in the use of Otter Creek, criminal and 
civil actions and Judge Call's decree followed. There-
after, as they had prior to the entry of the decree, 
the respondents were vigilant in interrupting the 
Jacksons use of their water. They not only went 
upstream each year to the Jackson property, recap-
tured their water, with the Jackson's knowledge, 
and diverted it downstream; but they employed 
water masters, engineers and constructed diversion 
dams to accomplish this purpose. 
It was not merely a matter of respondents once 
a year recapturing their water but it was a con-
tinuous operation beginning as some testified in 
early May and not later than the first of June and 
continuing thereafter until the middle of July. (R 
193, 153-155, 130, 150, 142-143, 123-124, 157). 
William T. Rex, who irrigated from all three 
forks (R 131) testified that one of the respon·dents 
in at least every five year period, talked with the 
Jacksons, at the Jackson property and turned the 
water down (R 123-125). He said: 
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A. Why, somebody would go up and talk 
to Jackson, get them to let loose a bit and 
come dow11. 
Q. ,..fhen you'd get more water down 
there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now was that done, would you say, 
frequently after 1919 up to 1940? 
A. I think so, yes. 
Q. About how often? 
A. Maybe every week sometime maybe 
twice a month or something like that some-
body would go up. 
And Frank Jackson, a respondent, testified 
that several times each year, between 1919 and 1940, 
beginning not later than June 1st and extending 
through the middle of July, one of the respondents 
would go up to the Jacksons and turn their water 
down. 
A. We'd have to try and locate it, bring 
some more down. 
Q. Now would you say that that hap-
pened from the time the decree was entered 
up until say 1940? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And about how often would you say 
they'd go up during that period of time? 
A. Well, some years it would be quite 
regular. Probably once or twice a week, maybe 
more than that. Other times, according to the 
13 
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amount of water we got down to our diver-
sion, it would be less ( R 19-28 page 142) . 
When you consider the foregoing testimony, 
it explains and clarifies the witnesses statements 
the interruptions occurred in May up to and into 
the middle of July. 
As to the date of interruptions, the respondent 
Mrs. Argyle testified the respondents required their 
water the first of May of each year (R 192) and 
that they recaptured it the forepart of May of each 
year (R 193). She said: 
Ao Well, they tried to get it around the 
first of May when Mr. Jackson and Thornock 
and Hoffman could go up to the divider or 
splitter, we called it. 
Q. And would you say that that hap-
pened, that you got the water that early from 
-how often would you say from 1919 to 
1929? 
A. Well, it would be the fore part of 
May always. 
Q. The fore part of May always? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Each year? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you know that of your own 
knowledge? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hoffman who acquired his property in 
1922 (R 153) said each year from 1923 through 
14 
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the 1940's in the spring, someone went upstream 
and recaptured the respondents water from the 
Jacksons (R 153-157). 
A. Each succeeding year we went up, 
some of us. Not always the same men, but we 
went up each year, put in the dams and 
brought our water down to irrigate our 
ground with. 
and again he said : 
Q. And about how often, over what peri-
od of years did you have to go up there in 
order to secure your water? 
A. Oh, we went - I went every year 
from 1923 until on up into the 1940's. 
Q. Until the forties? 
A. Yes. 
and that they divided the water allowing Richard 
Jackson sufficient water to irrigate 180 acres: 
Q. Do you recall in what proportions 
that the water was divided? 
A. It was divided giving Richard Jack-
son 180 acres. 
Q. 180 acres? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hellstrom, who sold out to Mr. Hoffman 
in 1922, testified they went upstream retaking their 
water between the first of May and the middle of 
July (R 83). He said: 
A. It would be somewhere right between 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
May and - the first of May and the middle 
of July, somewhere along in there. That's 
the time we irrigate. 
William Rex testified they went up in May, 
June and the early part of July for their water (R 
130). He said: 
Q. Do you know during what period of 
time that you was short of water and went up 
to get water, about what time of the year? 
A. Well, it would be along in the sum-
mertime, along in May or June, the early 
part of July. 
Q. And when it would get short you'd 
go up and talk to Dick about it, is that right? 
A. Yes, sir, that's right. 
The respondent Frank Jackson said they went 
up yearly between 1919 and 1940 and retook their 
water from the first of June through July (R 142, 
150). He said: 
A. Well, they went up to try to get more 
water down. 
Q. Now, after they had been up there, 
did you observe whether or not there was 
more water came down? 
A. Well, most times there was. 
Q. There was. Do you recall about what 
time of the year that would be? 
A. Well, it would usually be from the 
first of June on up through July, into July. 
Usually fared pretty well up until that time. 
Q. And then it was-
16 
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A. The water would get short. 
Q. And when it would get short 
A. We'd have to try and locate it, bring 
some more down. 
Q. Now would you say that that hap-
pened from the time the decree was entered 
up until say 1940? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And about how often would you say 
they'd go up during that period of time? 
A. Well, some years it would be quite 
regular. Probably once or twice a week, maybe 
more than that. Other times, according to the 
amount of water we got down to our diver-
sion, it would 'be less. ( R 142) 
The respondent Mr. Nichols testified that al-
though he could not recall the dates or the years 
that they went up almost every year and retook their 
water (R 111-112). He said: 
Q. Between 1919 and 1940. 
A. Yes, I guess there was. We was up 
there al1nost every year, but I just couldn't 
recall the dates or even the years, because we 
were up there almost very year. Someone 
was-
Q. Now, "every year", you're speaking 
of what period of time? 
A. Well, I wasn't there during the years 
of from the middle of 1920 until I believe it 
was in either '23 or '24. 
Q. But other years you were there? 
17 
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A. Other years I was there. 
Q. Other years you have personally gone 
up the ditch for your water? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. On all of those occasions, Mr. Nich-
olls, were you successful in having the water 
turned down? 
A. I was. 
Q. And on all of those occasions how 
was that achieved by you? 
A. By getting it turned down? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, I always went and talked to 
them. I never did tear the dams out alone. 
I always went and got them and they helped 
me divide it. 
Q. Whom do you speak of as "them"? 
A. Well, whoever was on the Jackson 
place. 
Q. Irrigating for the Jacksons? 
A. That's right. 
The respondents witnesses Nichols, William 
Rex, Charles Rex, Frank Jackson, and Hoffman 
testified that when they went upstream to the Jack-
sons for the purpose of recapturing their water, 
that they took, often with the Jacksons help, 11./12 
of the stream and left 1/12 for the Jacksons use. 
(R 105-109, 110-115, 125, 129-130, 134, 136-137, 
144-147, 149, 156, 161, 164-166, 169-170, 194-196.) 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The respondents not only recaptured their water 
but in so doing appellants predecessors in interest 
had knowledge that they were doing so. This knowl-
edge was brought home to the Jacksons in several 
ways: (1) The Jacksons use was interrupted while 
they were in actual use of the respondents water and 
the taking of the water would diminish their flow. 
( 2) By the tearing out of dams. ( 3) They discussed 
the retaking of their water with Richard Jackson 
( 4) and he and his sons and the respondents and 
the Jacksons together divided the water 1/12 to the 
Jacksons and 11/12 to the respondents, their pro-
portionate share of the Creek. (R 105, 109, 110-115, 
118-119, 121-125, 129-130, 134-137, 143-145, 147-
149, 156-157, 163-164, 169-170, 180, 194-196.) 
That the respondents were diligent in protect-
ing their rights is further borne out by the fact that 
they hired water masters and engineers to recon-
struct their weirs and assist in the measurement of 
the water. The first of these people were hired in 
1927 and they consisted of the following: Mr. Ger-
man and Jesse Read in 1927 (R 157-159), Mr. 
Schaub in 1930 (R 147-148, 159-1160), George D. 
Clyde in 1933 through 1937 (R 160-161, 182), Mr. 
Cox followed Gov. Clyde (R 140, 162-163). Also 
see (R 134, 135, 157, 159, 160, 150, 161-163, 165, 
169, 118-119.) 
The foregoing evidence overwhelmingly sus-
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tains the trial court's findings that timely interrup-
tions occurred during the period claimed. The Court 
having found timely interruptions, it should be held 
that appellants had not adversed the respondents, in 
any manner whatsoever, and this is supported by 
Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. vs. Lindsay Land 
and Livestock Co., supra. 
In Justice Larson's concurring and dissenting 
opinion, he said: 
"I concur in the opinion, except as to the 
part thereof holding that the claim of Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Company must fail as to the 
water used by Nichols. The opinion holds that 
Nichols, predecessor in interest of Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co. had used these waters 
adversely, ever since the Kimball Decree, but 
there had never been a seven-year period with-
out an interruption of the user, and lays down 
the rule that a mere showing that the water 
had once been turned out of the ditch of the 
adverse user tolled the running of the seven-
year period. From that holding I emphatically 
dissent. It is decidedly too broad for condi-
tions prevailing in regard to the uses made of 
the water under the record in this case. Fur-
thermore, it is not in accord with the author-
ities. 
The rule as stated may be correct where 
the claimed right involves of necessity a con-
stant, continuous possession and use. But here 
irrigation '\Vater is generally not used con-
tinuously on the same lands. Irrigation is a 
rotating process. The land is watered and then 
the water is shut off for a period of time; 
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then turned on for another soaking, and again 
shut off. The uncontradicted evidence is that 
Nichols used the water approximately two 
days each ten days on one tract, from June 
to September, inclusive, and on the other tract 
during July, August and September. After 
irrigating the land he would shut the water 
off. Much of the time he did not have any 
water on the land. The witnesses who testified 
to turning water off from Nichols' ditches 
testified in most cases they did not see Nichols. 
Many times they did not even go down to 
see if the 'vater was being used, or was flow-
ing upon his land. On at least one occasion 
when they saw Nichols using the water, they 
asked him to cooperate and use it sparingly 
because the stream was so small. He answered 
that he was willing to cooperate and get along 
with as little proportionately as did the other 
users, and he would turn it off when he was 
through. With that they left him to turn it 
off when he finished his irrigating. 
When water is claimed only for limited 
periods of time, or in limited quantities, or 
for limited purposes, interruptions in usage 
must be such as to make an interruption of 
such right as is claimed; must be such as to 
molest or interfere with the use to the extent 
it is claimed or asserted; to the extent of the 
beneficial use claimed or usable. For example 
where one claims a right to a11d usage of 
water on Monday from 6:00 o'clock a.m. to 
12:00 o'clock noon to irrigate an acre of straw-
berries, shutting off the flow on Tuesday 
after the patch is watered is not an inter-
ference with, or interruption of the use. Of 
course, when a constant continuous flow is 
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claimed, any interruption in the flow is an 
interruption in the use. * * *" 
Justice Larson's opinion sustains our position, 
however, we 'believe that the minority opinion as to 
interruptions written by Judge Wolf, then Chief 
Justice, and concurred in by Justice McDonough, 
is a sounder view and we call the court's attention 
to Pages 641-643, Pacific Reporter. This also sup-
ports our position. 
We believe that the foregoing answers the posi-
tion taken by the appellants in their brief. However, 
we would like briefly to point out that the appel-
lants predecessors in interest did not use the water 
after the Call Decree without difficulties, as prob-
lems over the use of water required the respondents 
to employ engineers to assist them in measuring 
reconstructing weirs and dividing the water. Not-
withstanding the appellants predecessors in interest, 
the Jacksons in using the water assisted in dividing 
it, and made no claims, so the respondents testified, 
that they had a right to use the water in excess of 
that decreed by Judge Call. (R 114-115, 129-130, 
136, 139, 156, 163-164) 
We agree there is evidence that some of the 
respondents testified, except for dry years, that 
they had adequate water for their lands above the 
Woodruff Canal until the Canal Water was turned 
off on July 1st. However, this was not the case as 
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to others and it should be particularly kept in mind 
that over 1100 acres of the respondents land receives 
no water from the Canal. 
We agree, also, there is evidence that appel-
lants predecessors in interest continued to irrigate 
355 acres and used the same ditches as were used 
prior to 1919. However, an analysis of the evidence 
shows that althou·gh they did not cut their acreage, 
but the amount of water was definitely reduced; 
they merely spread the available water over the 
area. Mr. Nichols testified appellants predeces-
sors in interest irrigated " ... at it". (R 112) 
and that although they didn't cut the acreage down 
that they cut the water down (R 117) and Mr. 
William Rex said he didn't see how they could irri-
gate the 355 acres as he was at times short of 
water (R 130) and in this respect Ray Hoffman 
testified that the Jacksons had irrigated all of their 
lands under all of their ditches sometime of the 
year. (17 4-175) 
Irrespective of whether the Court believes the 
Jacksons substantially irrigated 355 acres and that 
some of respondents do not require all of their water 
from Otter Creek before July 1st is immaterial, 
as the only questions are whether Richard Jackson 
could acquire an adverse right and if so whether 
the respondents timely recaptured their water and 
interrupted the Jackson in its use so as to destroy 
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the running of the adverse period. 
ADVERSE INTERESTS CANNOT BE AC-
QUIRED IN VIOLATION OF AN INJUNCTION 
The appellants action is dependent on whether 
Richard Jackson acquired an adverse interest be-
tween 1919 and 1939. This he could not do for ad-
verse rights cannot be acquired in violation of a 
court's injunction. 
The appellants title is derived from James Jack-
son who acquired the property from his father Rich-
ard Jackson in 1940 (R 20-21). The Judge Call de-
cree of 1919 perpetually enjoined Richard Jackson 
and his successors in interest from using or divert-
ing any more water than was necessary to irrigate 
180 acres of land plus seepage, overflow and stock 
watering rights. (Page 2 of Decree·, Case No. 43) 
IT IS FURTHER CONSIDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED that defendant, 
Richard Jackson, and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under him, be, and they are here-
by perpetually enjoined during the time from 
the 1st day of April to the 1st day of Novem-
ber, of each and every year, from diverting 
and using more than is necessary to irrigate 
180 acres of his land, plus his respective share 
of sepage _and underflow, as herein provided, 
· and computed on the basis which 180 acres 
bears to the total acreage of 2140 acres. 
An act done in violation of an injunction is un-
available for the purpose intended. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"* * * An act done in violation of injunc-
tion, being unlawful, is to be deemed inef-
fectual and unavailable as to the purpose in-
tended as though it had not been done * * *". 
28 Am. Jur. P 834, Sec. 322. 
and in Farmworth vs. Fowler, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 
1, 55 Am. Dec. 718, the Court said: 
"As to the effect of the writ we may ob-
serve that it is directed to the defendant, and 
its action is upon him in personam, and it 
renders it unlawful in him to do the thing 
prohibited or to fail or omit to do the thing 
commanded. The act being unlawful, it is 
deemed ineffectual and unavailable, as to the 
purpose intended as though it had not been 
done· * * *" 
' 
In Langford vs. Griffin, 17 S.W. 2d 296 the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a person 
could not acquire adverse interests while subject 
to an injunction. Davis the appellees predecessor 
in interest was perpetually enjoined in 1896 from 
enclosing or obstructing an alley. In 1898 Davis con-
veyed his property to his mother Emma Davis for 
life with reversion to him at her death. She died 
early in the year 1927. In August of that year Davis 
conveyed to appellee by warranty deed. The appellee 
claimed adverse right beginning 1902 through 1907 
relying on the possession of John M. Davis' and his 
mother. The Court said: 
"Under the facts detailed above appel-
lee's claim of title to the alley is necessarily a 
claim of title thereto by adverse possession of 
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himself, John M. David, and John M. Davis' 
mother, Emn1a Davis. His deed from John M. 
Davis in 1897 was for lot 6 and did not em-
brace the alley. If he obtained possession of 
the alley from John M. Davis and John M. 
Davis succeeded his mother in possession 
thereof and the two of them inclosed the alley 
in 1902 under an agreement between John M. 
Davis and A. M. McKennon, who owned lot 
8 on the south side of the alley, it was all in 
violation of the decree rendered against John 
M. Davis in favor of A. P. May in 1896, per-
manently enjoining him from entering into 
possession of the alley. It is argued that 
neither appellee nor Emma Davis were parties 
to the injunction suit and were not and are 
not bound by the decree rendered therein. In 
this contention appellee is mistaken, for the 
decree was binding upon John M. Davis and 
all persons in privity of estate with him. Ap-
pellee's claim of title to the alley is based upon 
his privity in estate thereto with John M. 
Davis, else he has no claim at all. As John M. 
Davis was enjoined from obstructing or en-
tering into possession of the alley, the con-
tinuity of appellee's possession was necessarily 
broken. In the face of the decree he could not 
acquire title by continuous, adverse posses-
sion through John M. Davis.'' 
CONCLUSION 
1. The respondents submit that Richard Jack-
son, the appellants predecessor in interest did not 
acquire and could not acquire an adverse use to the 
water claimed for the reason that any acts of his 
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would be ineffectual in the face of the prohibition in 
the Judge Call decree. 
2. That the trial ·court having found inter-
ruptions as of June 1st, the respondents are en-
titled as a matter of law to a finding that the 
appellants predecessor in interest, acquired no rights 
by adverse use and this is so, whether the use is 
claimed for the irrigation season, or to July 1, and 
3. In any event the evidence sustains the find-
ings of the trial court of interruptions as of June 
1st and the evidence does not warrant the Court 
to extend the adverse use to July 1st. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. DELOS DAINES 
822 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DAVID R. DAINES 
Cache Valley Bank Building 
Logan, Utah 
ZACHARY T. CHAPLIN 
Logan, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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